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
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MARITIME FACTORS AFFECTING IBERIAN SECURITY

Bradford Dismukes
Charles C. Petersen

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Enduring geopolitical realities have given special weight to maritime affairs in the history of security planning for the Iberian Peninsula. Maritime factors remain important today, and I know of no analyst of military affairs who foresees their diminished importance in the future. (This paper will review the threats to Iberian security that would arise directly or indirectly from maritime axes in the context of a major war between East and West today and in the near future. This context is selected, not because it is the most probable, but because it provides the most severe and comprehensive threats against which to assess military requirements and, more important, because it is exactly the eventuality whose occurrence state security policy should be designed to prevent. Time and space do not permit attention to conflicts of lower intensity nor indeed to the "peacetime" threats to the Iberian region that arise from the politico-military actions of other states, and this is regrettable because the latter, especially, are much more likely to occur and are in the aggregate, in the author's opinion, equally threatening to the world balance of power.

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In the discussion of the maritime aspects of a war between the great coalitions which follows, we will, first, assess Soviet goals in general war and the concept of operations the Soviets will employ to achieve those goals, and second, the role assigned Soviet maritime power -- primarily the Soviet Navy. In the process, I shall be outlining a "scenario," to use the common U.S. term, but I wish to emphasize that I provide this "generic" European scenario mainly as a concrete framework to help discuss and evaluate the ideas that follow. If one selects a somewhat different scenario, the implications that relate to Iberian security we shall be discussing in the third and concluding part of the paper may be modified accordingly but should not be invalidated.

Soviet War Goals and Concept of Operations

The goals of the USSR in a war in Europe, no matter how it arises, are, in order of priority, (1) to minimize damage to the military-economic potential of the USSR; (2) to maintain dominance over the "Socialist Commonwealth"; (3) to defeat NATO armed forces in Europe; and (4) to seize and occupy the territory of its European adversaries. According to Soviet views, in such a war, the central region will be the decisive

axis and ground forces will be the decisive means. All other forces and means -- including naval and intercontinental forces -- and all other theaters and axes will remain subordinate to ground action on the central front. An intercontinental exchange may or may not take place; if it does, the Soviets may hope to eliminate the United States as a European power.

Soviet forces outside Europe (e.g., along the Chinese frontier), almost certainly will come to a high state of readiness, they may attack preemptively if threatened, but given Soviet conservatism and geographic priorities, they would not, in my opinion, initiate combat against non-European states until the course of the struggle in the central region of Europe began to take shape. An exception to the above would be NATO ships at sea or the military forces of NATO nations located ashore outside NATO territory, if they could be destroyed at reasonable costs to the Soviets.

One cannot of course specify with confidence the geographic extent of the "enemy" in Soviet plans today. Whether French military forces on French territory are targeted for Soviet initial attacks is difficult to say; much would depend on French policy and the cir-

cumstances under which the war arose. The same, of course, is true for Spanish military forces. However, there seems to be absolutely no reason to doubt that today, when Soviet military planners calculate the "correlation of military forces" between themselves and their opponents, neither France nor Spain is reckoned on the "friendly" side of their balance sheets.

There seems to be near universal agreement that Soviet ground forces would attempt to achieve an early breakthrough and the most rapid advance westward possible, perhaps presenting NATO decision-makers with a fait accompli before a decision could be taken to employ NATO nuclear weapons in the field. Soviet actions on NATO's northern and southern flanks would, at a minimum, be on a scale necessary to ensure that those regions could not be used as points d'appui for NATO counterattacks; successful seizure of the Danish and Turkish Straits could lead to the exit of that part of the Soviet Baltic and Black Sea Fleets not already deployed forward. Throughout this campaign, Soviet strategic nuclear weapons would seek to deter the use of NATO strategic weapons, both Euro-strategic and intercontinental, while a rapid victory is achieved on the ground.

The Role of Maritime Forces

What is the role of maritime forces, if the war develops as I have outlined it so far -- that is, if it follows the path the Soviet planners probably prefer? Almost certainly, in the Soviet view, naval forces are seen as peripheral. A part of the Soviet Navy, already deployed forward, would be augmented in the period of tension. Its tasks in the war's opening hours and days will be to destroy any enemy strategic systems that can be attacked at sea and in port, to strike enemy naval forces, ashore and at sea, enemy surveillance systems, and enemy military sealift; and to carry out offensive mining. Its main objective is to attrite, harass and tie down Western seapower so that it cannot be brought to bear on targets nearer the USSR. But the majority of the Soviet Navy -- including, during the war's conventional phase, perhaps much of land-based Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) -- will probably operate nearer the USSR. Its tasks are to provide a defense in depth for the SSBNs of the Northern (and Pacific) Fleets and for the USSR proper and to support the land campaign through seizure of straits and islands, destruction of enemy ports and naval facilities, delivery of logistic and fire sup-

port to ground forces, and countering enemy amphibious and tactical air strike operations.

The Mediterranean Sea presents a special problem for Soviet planners. Prudence requires that they regard the Strait of Gibraltar as an extremely hazardous passage even for their submarines, if not in the war's initial period, at least, to be closed to their forces. The Turkish Straits similarly will be closed, as long as Turkish forces hold even one side of the Bosphorus or Dardanelles and perhaps longer, if a NATO mining campaign in the Dardanelles and its approaches were to be mounted and sustained. Therefore, the Soviets must be prepared to fight the naval campaign in the Mediterranean with the naval forces initially present in the Mediterranean for at least the amount of time they expect their forces will require to seize and clear the Turkish Straits. These forces would be supported of course by SNA and LRA based initially in the Crimea and later perhaps staged from bases farther to the west. These factors imply the Soviets will adopt a rather conservative employment strategy in the Mediterranean, designed to husband resources and, initially at least, to prevent the seaborne reinforcement, resupply, and tactical air support of Greek and

Turkish ground forces from the West. Soviet actions in the Western Mediterranean might take the form of screening, reconnaissance and harassment by submarine forces and, of course, such land-based aviation as can be spared from other tasks. All of this assumes that the USSR does not develop sufficiently close political relationships with one or more states on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean to allow them to plan to base or stage aircraft from airfields in such countries. We must presume that the Soviets plan to move the locus of their operations in the Mediterranean steadily westward to secure the southern flank of their advancing ground forces.

Soviet Priorities and the Role of Western Sea Lanes of Communication

But what if the war does not develop along these lines? What if the war becomes prolonged at the conventional level? (May we postpone for a moment the complications arising from the introduction of nuclear weapons.) Soviet planners have undoubtedly considered this possibility as well, and I believe it has played an important role thus far in their calculations of the overall correlation of military forces: In particular, seapower will have increasing effect on the

course and outcome of hostilities. Moreover, the United Kingdom and Iberian Peninsula potentially represent operational depth for the Western powers which, in combination with the massive resupply of material and men across the Atlantic from North America, could make the longevity of a Soviet "victory" on the ground over NATO in Europe highly tenuous.

Given the focus of this paper, let me concentrate on the seaborne resupply aspect (although it is conceivable that both the United Kingdom and the Iberian Peninsula could also be the source of amphibious and counter-amphibious operations). Earlier, I imputed to Soviet planners a relatively low priority in the war's initial period to a massive campaign against the sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the North Atlantic. However, that estimated priority reflects four important factors in the Soviet view: first, their expectation that the duration of combat on the ground will be brief enough that resupply from North America will be irrelevant to the campaign's outcome; second, their expectation that Western European coastal waters, including those of the Iberian Peninsula, may be vulnerable to mining and submarine operations and that Western European ports are vulnerable to attacks with con-

ventional weapons; third, their respect for Western high seas SLOC defense capabilities, achieved as the result of decades of heavy investment in ASW and AAW as well as operational developments in those fields; and fourth, and, in my opinion, most important, other tasks assigned to the Soviet Navy which arise later in the course of hostilities.

Let us take up this last factor first because it is, as I've suggested, the overriding concern of Soviet naval planners today. Soviet doctrinal writings since the late 1960s have given evidence of Soviet concern with the security of their ballistic missile submarines. Since roughly 1971, that concern has focused on Soviet SSBNs in the role of a force withheld from initial strikes to serve as a strategic reserve with military and political utility. This is not a secondary but a primary task for the Soviet Navy; the existence of an SSBN force in being is designed to prevent the subjugation of the Soviet state, if the war should go badly for the Soviets, but more likely in the Soviet view, it is to underwrite or guarantee the Soviet hold on territory captured by Soviet ground forces and to help the USSR dominate the "postwar" world -- van-

guished enemies, non-belligerents and erstwhile allies.

The importance of the SSBN strategic reserve cannot be overstated. The Soviets have consistently coupled the idea of a withheld strategic SSBN force with general-purpose naval forces which are also withheld from combat in the forward area to provide command of the sea on behalf of the SSBN strategic reserve, the requirement for which is most acute in the war's closing days. Indeed, it is for this mission -- command of the sea on behalf of the Soviet strategic reserve -- that the Kiev-class aircraft carrier and her reported nuclear-powered successor class, as well, no doubt, as the new destroyer and cruiser classes, have been constructed. Air power is, in the Soviets view, the key to command of the sea, and in the nuclear phase of the war, which the Soviets fully expect and plan for, air power will reliably come only from aircraft carriers. After all, prudent planners cannot rely on the availability of very much of land-based aviation which is unlikely to survive the nuclear counterforce strikes that will, in the Soviet view, mark the beginning of the war's nuclear phases.

This assessment of Soviet priorities leads to the conclusion that today, the Soviet Navy is assigned tasks of paramount importance to the Soviet state. For the first time in its history, the USSR has a stake in the positive use of the seas, and is in the process of acquiring general-purpose naval forces whose missions for the first time go beyond the denial of the use of the sea by others -- which historically has been the goal of Soviet seapower.

A Soviet Campaign Against Western Sea Lines of Communication

With this idea of Soviet naval priorities in mind, let us now consider the factors affecting Soviet planning regarding a campaign against NATO sea lines of communication in the Atlantic, giving special attention, where relevant, to the Iberian Peninsula and associated islands. If the war becomes prolonged -- that is, if the Soviet blitzkrieg is halted somewhere in NATO territory for military, political, or perhaps a combination of both reasons, resupply of Western forces from North America will become a major factor in the war's course and outcome -- indeed, a factor very likely to become more important than relative

technological quality or operational finesse on the battlefield.

As I suggested earlier, to interrupt Western resupply efforts, Soviet forces are very likely to intensify planned mining and submarine operations in the waters of northern Europe and, to the degree they are capable, in the waters of the Bay of Biscay southward to the Straits of Gibraltar and in the western Mediterranean. Whether the Backfire force will be committed in numbers during the conventional phase of such a campaign is difficult to say. If it is, its initial targets are likely to be Western ocean surveillance facilities, airfields, and port facilities, especially those equipped to handle container ships, and, of course, Western naval forces assigned to convoy defense.

It has long been recognized that more southerly routes for transatlantic convoys would reduce the threat from Soviet land-based aviation they might face (again, assuming that no Soviet bases are available in North or West Africa), as well as giving Western ASW forces greater opportunity to be brought to bear on the Soviet submarine threat. Such routing, should it be

adopted, will of course further increase the importance of the Canary Islands. It goes without saying that the Azores and Madeira are as crucial to the struggle in the Atlantic as Gibraltar and the Balearics are to the control of the western Mediterranean. The Iberian Peninsula itself could serve as the terminus of transatlantic convoys or provide the basis for air and anti-submarine defense of such convoys en route to more northerly and easterly destinations.

Finally, let us take note of the well-known reality that the timing and scale of introduction of nuclear weapons in the war, should they be employed, will have a profound effect on the nature and duration of hostilities. However, the mobility of naval forces makes them less vulnerable to nuclear weapons than other kinds of armed forces, and the common conception that nuclear weapons entirely vitiate naval forces seems misplaced. On the contrary, as the ballistic missile submarine building programs of the maritime powers seem to confirm, naval forces seem to have a special place in nuclear war -- or, to be more precise, in deterring war and in controlling escalation to nuclear levels, should war occur.

We have now reviewed the major maritime aspects of a war between East and West, should it occur. We have seen that the Iberian Peninsula retains a vital geo-strategic potential in such a war, particularly in its maritime dimensions. My own opinion is that strong maritime and air defense capabilities on the part of the Iberian states can play an important role in deterring the perilous eventualities discussed above and thus contribute to the security and well-being of the Western nations at large.

**FACTORES MARÍTIMOS
QUE AFECTAN
LA SEGURIDAD IBÉRICA**

FACTORES MARÍTIMOS QUE AFECTAN LA SEGURIDAD IBÉRICA

Introducción

En lo que atañe a la seguridad ibérica, la realidad geopolítica peninsular y europea ha dado una importancia especial a los asuntos marítimos a través de la historia. Los factores marítimos permanecen importantes hoy en día, y no conozco de ningún investigador de cuestiones militares que prevea que sean de menos importancia en los años venideros.

En la presente charla voy a tratar de las amenazas a la seguridad ibérica que surgirían, actualmente y en el futuro próximo, desde los ejes marítimos en caso de guerra general entre Oriente y Occidente. Para comenzar hablaré de los fines soviéticos en una guerra general y del concepto de operaciones que ellos emplearán para lograr estos fines; luego hablaré sobre el papel que desempeñará la marina de guerra soviética en aquel conflicto. En cuanto proceda con esto, reseñaré un "escenario" genérico europeo que nos servirá de esqueleto o armazón para examinar y evaluar las ideas que voy a presentar.

Fines de guerra soviéticos y concepto de operaciones para lograrlos

Los fines de la Unión Soviética en una guerra europea -- como quiera que ésta comience -- son los siguientes (en orden de pri-

oridad): primero, reducir al mínimo cualquier daño a su potencia militar y económica; segundo, mantener su soberanía sobre la "comunidad socialista"; tercero, derrotar a las fuerzas militares de la OTAN en el continente europeo; y cuarto, conquistar y ocupar el territorio de sus adversarios europeos. Al pensar soviético, el frente decisivo en aquella guerra será la región central de Europa, y las fuerzas principales las terrestres. En cuanto a otras fuerzas militares -- navales e intercontinentales inclusive -- u otros teatros de acción militar, éstos serán de menor importancia. Un intercambio intercontinental nuclear es posible, mas no inevitable; en caso de que éste ocurra, es probable que los soviéticos esperen, por lo menos, eliminar a los Estados Unidos como potencia europea.

A mi juicio, los soviéticos no comenzarán sus esfuerzos militares dirigidos contra estados extraeuropeos hasta aclararse el desarrollo del combate en la región central del continente. Como excepciones debemos señalar a navíos de guerra u otras fuerzas militares de la OTAN si sucede que éstos se encuentren fuera de los estados miembros de la OTAN y se puedan eliminar sin mayores gastos soviéticos.

No se puede, desde luego, precisar con certeza la extensión geográfica del "enemigo" en los planes de guerra actuales de la Unión Soviética. No se puede decir, por ejemplo, si las fuerzas militares francesas situadas en territorio francés figuran en estos planes como objetivos de los primeros ataques soviéticos; mucho

dependería de la política francesa del momento y de las circunstancias en las cuales la guerra comienza. Lo mismo, por cierto, corresponde a las fuerzas militares españolas. Sin embargo, no cabe la menor duda de que ni Francia ni España aparecen como "países amigos" en el cálculo soviético de la "correlación de fuerzas militares" en el continente europeo.

Hay, al parecer, acuerdo casi universal de que las fuerzas terrestres soviéticas intentarán cuanto antes lograr una brecha en la línea de combate y avanzar hacia el oeste con cuanto rapidez sea posible, a fin de crear un hecho consumado antes que la OTAN pueda llegar a una determinación acerca del empleo de armas nucleares en el campo de batalla. Las maniobras soviéticas hacia el flanco septentrional y meridional del continente alcanzarán, por lo menos, la escala necesaria para asegurar que estas regiones no se empleen como puntos de partida para contraataques Occidentales. A través de la campaña los soviéticos procurarán asegurar mediante la "balanza del terror" que las armas nucleares estratégicas de la OTAN no se empleen en contra suya.

El rol de las fuerzas navales

¿Que papel desempeñarán las fuerzas marítimas en aquella guerra? Es casi seguro que al parecer soviético las fuerzas navales serán de significado periférico. Aquella parte de la marina de guerra soviética que está ya desplegada en el océano será aumentada du-

rante el período de tensión anterior al comienzo de las hostilidades. Durante las primeras horas y los primeros días de la guerra sus tareas serán las de destruir a cuantos sistemas estratégicos enemigos se encuentren a mano, sembrar campos de minas para estropear la movilidad enemiga, acometer a las fuerzas navales del enemigo, y atacar sus sistemas de reconocimiento y medios de transporte militar marítimo. El propósito principal de tal esfuerzo es el de desgastar, hostigar e inmovilizar al poder marítimo del Occidente de manera que éste no se pueda emplear contra objetivos próximos a la Unión Soviética. Pero es probable que la mayor parte de las fuerzas navales soviéticas estará maniobrando en aguas mas cercanas a la patria.

Las misiones de éstas incluyen: proporcionar defensa en profundidad para los SSBN¹ de la Flota del Norte (y del Pacífico) tanto como para la propia Unión Soviética; apoyar la campaña terrestre; tomando estrechos e islas estratégicas; destruir puertos y bases navales del enemigo;² proporcionar apoyo logístico y de fuego a las fuerzas terrestres; y defender contra operaciones anfíbias y de aviación táctica del enemigo.

¹Es decir, submarinos de proyectiles balísticos nucleares.

²Empleando proyectiles lanzados desde SSBN y desde aviones pertenecientes a la aviación naval.

El mar Mediterráneo ofrece un problema único para los estrategas soviéticos. La discreción exige que el estrecho de Gibraltar se considere como paso arriesgadísimo durante el período inicial de la guerra, aún para submarinos. Los estrechos Turcos serán igualmente peligrosos desde el punto de vista soviético, siempre que las fuerzas turcas ocupen siquiera un banco del Bósforo o de los Dardanelos. Deben por ende los soviéticos estar preparados para emprender la campaña naval en el Mediterráneo empleando las fuerzas navales ya desplegadas en este lugar (desde luego con el apoyo de la Aviación Naval y de Largo Alcance de las Fuerzas Aéreas soviéticas). Estos factores señalan una estrategia soviética algo conservadora, cuyos propósitos son de guardar recursos e impedir el abastecimiento por la mar y el apoyo táctico aéreo para las fuerzas terrestres griegas y turcas de parte de la OTAN. Las actividades soviéticas en el Mediterráneo occidental podrían tomar la forma de operaciones de cobertura, reconocimiento y hostigamiento ejecutadas por submarinos y por cuantos aviones no estén comprometidos a otras tareas de mayor prioridad. Todo esto da por supuesto que la Unión Soviética no logre desarrollar sus vínculos con los países del litoral austral mediterráneo hasta tal punto que se le otorgue el derecho de valerse de los aerodromos de éstos. Debemos además suponer que los soviéticos proyectan trasladar el foco de sus operaciones mediterráneas paulatinamente hacia el oeste al avanzar sus fuerzas terrestres, a fin de resguardarles el flanco meridional.

Prioridades soviéticas e importancia de las rutas marítimas occidentales

Mas ¿Que ocurriría si la guerra no se desenvuelve de esta manera? ¿Que ocurriría si la guerra se vuelve prolongada al nivel convencional? (Dejemos de lado por el momento las complicaciones que resultarían por la introducción de armas nucleares.) No cabe duda de que los estrategas soviéticos tambien han considerado esta eventualidad, y en mi opinión, es una que hasta ahora ha ocupado un importante lugar en el cálculo soviético de la correlación europea de fuerzas militares. El poderío naval en particular tendrá un efecto creciente sobre el transcurso y desenlace de las hostilidades a medida que la guerra se alargue. Por otra parte, el Reino Unido y la Península Ibérica ambos constituyen una retaguardia en potencia que -- en combinación con los abastecimientos necesarios desde Norteamérica -- podría volver efímero cualquier "triunfo" soviético en la región central.

Dado el tema de esta charla, voy a prestar atención ahora al abastecimiento transoceánico de las fuerzas de la OTAN. Anteriormente afirmé que para los soviéticos una campaña en gran escala dirigida contra las comunicaciones marítimas del Atlántico Norte durante el período inicial de la guerra no es de mayor prioridad. Vale decir, sin embargo, que aquel juicio resulta de cuatro importantes consideraciones: primera, la expectativa soviética de que el com-

bate en tierra será de corta duración; segunda, la expectativa de parte de Moscú de que se puedan sembrar minas y maniobrar submarinos en las aguas costeras de la Europa Occidental (incluyendo las de la Península Ibérica) y de que los puertos de aquella región se puedan atacar con armas convencionales; tercera, el respeto que tienen los soviéticos por la capacidad de la Alianza de defender sus líneas de comunicación marítima; y cuarta -- y a mi parecer la consideración mas importante -- las otras tareas que la marina de guerra soviética debe ejecutar mas tarde en el conflicto.

Tratemos sobre esta última en primer lugar, ya que es la que más preocupa a los estrategas soviéticos hoy en día. Desde el año 1971 aproximadamente, una parte de la fuerza soviética de SSBN ha estado encargada de servir de reserva estratégica. Ésta no es tarea secundaria de la marina soviética, sino principal. El propósito de dicha reserva es el de asegurar la posesión de los territorios ya conquistados por las fuerzas terrestres soviéticas, tanto como de garantizar el dominio de la URSS sobre el mundo de postguerra. En el caso contrario -- es decir, si la guerra va mal desde el punto de vista soviético -- aquella reserva serviría para desanimar intentos Occidentales de subyugar al estado soviético.

La importancia de la reserva estratégica apenas se puede exagerar. Fuerzas navales de uso general están señaladas para asegurar el dominio del mar en torno a la reserva, así proporcionándole protección. Más aún, los portaaviones de la clase "Kiev," tanto como la clase sucesora de propulsión nuclear, funcionarán en esta misma calidad; puesto que a juicio soviético el poderío aéreo es la clave del dominio del mar, y en la fase nuclear de la guerra no se podrá confiar sino en el poderío aéreo que proporcionarían los portaaviones.

Esta evaluación de las prioridades soviéticas nos permite concluir que la marina de guerra de la Unión Soviética esta encargada de tareas de capital importancia para el estado soviético. Por primera vez en su historia, la Unión Soviética tiene un interés en el uso positivo del océano, y esta adquiriendo fuerzas navales de propósito general cuyas tareas van más allá de la de negarles a otros el uso de la mar.

Una campaña soviética dirigida contra las rutas marítimas del Occidente

Teniendo en cuenta esta idea de las prioridades navales soviéticas, examinemos ahora los componentes del plan de ataque soviético en lo que se refiere a las rutas marítimas de la OTAN, prestando atención particular a la Península Ibérica e islas asociadas. Si sucede que la guerra se alarga (es decir, si el Blitzkrieg sovié-

tico se detiene antes de lograr sus fines en el continente europeo) el abastecimiento de las fuerzas Occidentales desde Norteamérica llegará a ser un factor importantísimo en cuanto al transcurso y desenlace de la guerra.

Como indique anteriormente, es muy probable que los soviéticos intentarán -- a fin de estropear el abastecimiento de la OTAN -- sembrar campos de minas e intensificar sus operaciones de submarinos en las aguas de la Europa del Norte y, en cuanto les sea posible, en el mar Cantábrico, el estrecho de Gibraltar, y el Mediterráneo occidental. Es difícil juzgar si se comprometerían aviones "Backfire" en grandes números durante la fase convencional de tal campaña. Pero si esto ocurre, es probable que los primeros objetivos suyos serían las bases navales y los puertos mercantes del Occidente -- en particular, aquellos que son capaces de recibir a contenedores -- y, desde luego, las fuerzas navales encargadas de escoltar los convoyes con destino a Europa.

El empleo de rutas meridionales para los convoyes transatlánticos haría disminuir la amenaza proveniente de aviones soviéticos basados en tierra. Si tales rutas se emplean, la importancia de las islas Canarias desde luego aumentaría aún más. Huelga decir que las islas Azores y Madeira son tan críticas para la lucha en el Atlántico como lo son las islas Baleares y el estrecho de Gibraltar para el dominio del Mediterráneo occidental. La misma Penín-

sula Ibérica podría servir de término para los convoyes transatlánticos o bien de base para la defensa antiaérea y antisubmarina de ellos.

Para concluir, tomemos nota de la realidad consabida de que tanto la hora de introducción como la escala de empleo de las armas nucleares en una guerra general ambas tendrán un efecto profundo sobre el carácter y la duración de las hostilidades. Sin embargo, en virtud de su movilidad las fuerzas navales son menos vulnerables que cualesquiera otras contra las armas nucleares; por lo tanto, la idea, muy corriente hoy en día, de que dichas armas hayan puesto en duda la utilidad de las fuerzas navales tiene poco fundamento.

En resumen, diría yo que la Península Ibérica tiene la potencialidad (cuanto más en sus aspectos marítimos) de ser un factor geoestratégico importantísimo en cualquiera guerra que haya entre Oriente y Occidente. En mi opinión, una poderosa defensa antiaérea y marítima de parte de los estados ibéricos contribuiría en alto grado al alejamiento de las azarosas posibilidades descritas aquí, y por ende a la seguridad y al bienestar de todas las naciones del Occidente.

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